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This paper extends Milgrom and Robert’s treatment of supermodular games in
two ways. It points out that their main characterization result holds under a
weaker assumption. It refines the arguments to provide bounds on the set of
strategies that survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. I derive
the bounds by iterating the best-response correspondence. I give conditions un-
der which they are independent of the order of deletion of dominated strategies.
The results have implications for equilibrium selection and dynamic stability in
games.
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1. Introduction
Milgrom and Roberts (1990)andVives(1990) provide useful analyses of the class of su-
permodular games introduced by Topkis (1979). In a supermodular game, each player’s
strategy set is partialy ordered and there are strategic complementarities that cause a
player’s best response to be increasing in opponents’ strategies. Milgrom and Roberts
and Vives describe many applications of the games in the class. Perhaps the leading
example is the linear Cournot duopoly.
Milgrom and Roberts (1990)andVives(1990) demonstrate that supermodular games
have a largest and smalest equilibrium. These equilibria necessarily are pure-strategy
Nash equilibria. Milgrom and Roberts demonstrate that these extreme equilibria can
be obtained by iterating the best-response correspondence and characterize the set of
strategies that survive iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. They show that
pure-strategy Nash equilibria exist in supermodular games. In addition, they provide
useful results about comparative statics and dynamic stability. These results enable
models to make more precise and more confident predictions for games with comple-
mentarities. Predictions are more precise because of the bounds; in general, largest and
smalest Nash equilibria need not exist. Predictions are more confident because they
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may not require equilibrium assumptions. Milgrom and Roberts give examples (includ-
ing Cournot duopoly) in which the largest equilibrium is equal to the smalest equilib-
rium. This observation not only guarantees uniqueness of equilibrium, but also im-
plies that the unique equilibrium is the only outcome that survives iterated deletion of
strictly dominated strategies. Hence, the prediction does not depend on the assump-
tion of equilibrium. What is more, the argument guarantees that a best-response dy-
namic arrives at the equilibrium, again suggesting that the equilibrium prediction has a
strong behavioral foundation. When the game has multiple equilibria, the existence of
lower and upper bounds stil ofers useful limits on predictions. Further, tools of mono-
tone comparative statics enable me to make statements about how the set of equilibria
responds to changes in parameters.
Not al games are supermodular. The current paper shows how to modify the tech-
niques pioneered by Milgrom and Roberts and Vives to a broader class. The extension
has two parts. First, I show that Milgrom and Roberts’s main results extend without mod-
ification to a slightly broader class of games. This extension is smal, both logicaly and
substantively. The logical extension is smal because one can prove the result with little
modification to Milgrom and Roberts’s argument. The substantive extension is smal be-
cause I do not have an economic applications in which the more general result provides
a novel insight. The second extension is more substantial. I establish results that paral-
lel those obtained by Milgrom and Roberts using a stronger solution concept, deleting
weakly dominated strategies rather than strongly dominated strategies. That is, I en-
large the class of supermodular games and describe the sets of strategies that survive
iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies.1Once again, this set wil be bounded
by a largest and smalest equilibrium. Analogs of existing results on dynamics and com-
parative statics also hold. This extension requires a modification of the existing proof
technique (so the paper makes a technical contribution) and alows one to apply the re-
sults to a class of games that includes a familiar model of communication that fails to be
supermodular. The second extension is substantive because there are games that satisfy
the generalized definition of supermodularity and have large sets of strategies that sur-
vive iterated strong dominance, but smaler sets that survive iterated weak dominance.
My extension is useful precisely because there are games with strategic complemen-
tarities in which strong dominance has little power to eliminate strategies, but weak
dominance is efective. It is not hard to generate games in this class. Imagine a game
obtained by adding an initial round to a supermodular game to create a two-stage game.
The initial stage might involve an investment choice, communication, or an attempt to
learn about the environment. When viewed as a strategic-form game, there wil typi-
caly be weakly dominated strategies (in complete information games, these strategies
may involve choosing second-stage actions that would be eliminated by an application
of subgame perfection). Elimination of strictly dominated strategies wil generaly lack
the power to reduce the strategy set, but eliminating weakly dominated strategies may
be efective. I apply the methods of this paper to cheap-talk games. I show that the set
1In related work, Kultti and Salonen (1997,1998) study supermodular games in which some weakly dom-
inated strategies are removed. I discuss these papers inSection 4.
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of strategies that survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies has nice fea-
tures (upper and lower bounds and attractive dynamic stability properties) and is strictly
smaler than the set of strategies that survives iterated deletion of strictly dominated
strategies.
The analysis leverages two things: discarding strategies that are weakly dominated
instead of strongly dominated has the potential to make the set of predictions stronger;
broadening the definition of supermodular games by weakening an assumption has the
potential to enlarge the class of games covered by the argument. I expand the class
of supermodular games by replacing an increasing-diferences condition used by Mil-
grom and Roberts and Vives with a weaker condition, interval dominance, introduced
by Quah and Strulovici (2009). The central property used in the literature is that best-
response correspondences are increasing. Increasing diferences guarantees monotonic
best replies, but interval dominance, a weaker condition, also implies the critical mono-
tonicity property.
Section 3points out a smal generalization of the basic result of Milgrom and
Roberts, characterizing the set of strategies that survive iterated deletion of strictly dom-
inated strategies.Section 4extends the results to weak dominance.Section 5discusses
the implications of the characterization result for comparative statics and dynamics.
Section 6discusses cheap-talk games and games involving competition in persua-
sion. I demonstrate that analogs of the methods introduced to study supermodular
games can refine the set of predictions in these games. These games are not interval-
dominance supermodular, but they satisfy a weaker condition under which the main
characterization result applies. Specificaly,Section 6.1studies cheap-talk games and
demonstrates that when a monotonicity assumption holds, the babbling equilibrium
fails to survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies whenever an informa-
tive equilibrium exists.Section 6.2describes a game introduced by Gentzkow and Ka-
menica (2017) to study Bayesian persuasion with multiple informed parties. This game
typicaly has multiple equilibria that are Pareto-ranked from the perspective of the in-
formed players. I point out that only the Pareto-efficient equilibrium survives iterated
deletion of weakly dominated strategies.
I place definitions of standard concepts inAppendix A(soastomakethepaperself-
contained).Appendix Bcontains proofs omitted from the main text,Appendix Ccon-
tains auxiliary results about interval-dominance conditions, andAppendix Dcontains
arguments that support claims made inSection 6.2.
2. Preliminaries
There is a finite set of players, which is denoted byI. Each player has a strategy setXi
with typical elementxi. The set of strategy profiles isX= i∈IXi.Idenotebyx−ithe
strategies of playeri’s opponents. Each strategy set is partialy ordered by≥i;≥denotes
the product order derived from≥i(so thatx≥xif and only ifxi≥ixifor ali). Denote
playeri’s utility function byui(xix−i).Denotebyu=(ui)i∈Ithe set of utility functions.
A game in ordered-normal form is =(IX u≥).
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Consider a setXwith a partial order≥that is transitive, reflexive, and antisymmet-
ric. I place standard definitions (lattice, chain, order continuity, supermodularity, strong
set order) inAppendix A.
This paper uses weaker versions of basic single-crossing properties. I review the ba-
sic ideas and then discuss the role they play in studying games in ordered-normal form.
Definition1. Given two latticesXandY, a functionf:X×Y→ Rhas increasing
diferences in its two argumentsxandyif, for alx≥x, the diferencef(x y)−f(xy)
is nondecreasing iny.
This paper replaces increasing diferences with weaker assumptions. There are sev-
eral ways to weaken the increasing-diferences property. The next definition is standard.
Definition2. Given two latticesXandY, a functionf:X×Y→ Rsatisfies the single-
crossing property in its two argumentsxandyif, for aly>y,x>x,
fx y ≥(>)fx y =⇒ fx y ≥(>)fx y (1)
Single crossing is also more restrictive than necessary.
Definition3. Given two latticesX andY, a functionf:X×Y→ Rsatisfies the
interval-dominance (ID) property in its two argumentsxandyif, for aly>y,x>x,
(1) holds wheneverf(x y)≥f(xy)for alx∈[x x].
Quah and Strulovici (2009) introduce condition ID and derive basic properties. Quah
and Strulovici (2007) give additional results, including detailed discussion of the impli-
cations of ID whenXis multidimensional. It is apparent that increasing diferences
implies single crossing, which in turn implies interval dominance. It is straightforward
to confirm that the converse implications do not hold.
The current paper introduces and uses variations on condition ID to study an appli-
cation. I defer these discussions to when they are needed inSection 6.
Definition4. The game =(IX u≥)is an interval-dominance supermodular (ID-
supermodular) game if, for eachi∈I, the folowing assumptions hold:
A1. The latticeXis a complete lattice.
A2. The functionui:X→ Ris order upper semicontinuous inxifor fixedx−i;uiis
order upper semicontinuous inx−ifor fixedxi;anduiis bounded above.
A3. For fixedx−i,uiis supermodular inxi.
A4. On al interval sublattices ofX,uisatisfies the interval-dominance property inxi
andx−i.
The distinction between supermodular and ID-supermodular games is that A4 re-
places the condition thatuihas increasing diferences.
A useful preliminary observation is Topkis’s monotonicity theorem.
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Fact1.LetXbe a lattice and letYbe a partialy ordered set. Letf(xy):X×Y→ R.
Suppose thatf(·)is supermodular inxfor fixedy. For any sublatticeX ⊂X, letM(X)≡
arg maxz∈X f(zy);M(X)isasublatticeofX. If, furthermore,X is complete andfis
order upper semicontinuous inxfor fixedy,thenM(X)is a complete sublattice ofX.
In the context of games,Fact 1states that the set of best replies forms a sublattice
when the payof function is supermodular in a player’s strategy. This result is part of the
Topkis monotonicity theorem as stated in Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
One important property of supermodular games is monotonicity of the best-reply
correspondence.2
Fact2.Let be an ID-supermodular game. LetJ=J1×···×JIbe an interval sublattice
ofX.Ifx−i≥x−i,then
arg max
xi∈Ji
uixix−i≥iarg maxxi∈Ji
uixix−i
Fact 2generalizes a result of Milgrom and Shannon (1994, Theorem 4) that assumes
the single-crossing property rather than ID and a result of Quah and Strulovici (2009,
Theorem1)thatassumesthatXis a subset ofR.QuahandStrulovici(2007, Theorem 1)
proveFact 2. As Milgrom and Shannon note, the lemma holds if one replaces the as-
sumption of supermodularity with the weaker assumption of quasi-supermodularity.3
Another important fact is Tarski’s fixed-point theorem.
Fact3.IfTis a complete lattice andf:T→ Tis a nondecreasing function, thenf(·)
has a fixed point. Moreover, the set of fixed points hassup{x∈T:f(x)≥x}as its largest
element andinf{x∈T:f(x)≤x}as its smalest element.
One can useFacts 2and3to establish the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilib-
rium. Consider mappings :X→ Xdefined by
(x)= min arg max
x1
u1x1x−1 min arg maxxn
unxnx−n
and
(x)= max arg max
x1
u1x1x−1 max arg maxxn
unxnx−n
By Facts1and2these mappings are wel defined and nondecreasing. Consequently,
they have fixed points. It is straightforward to show that these fixed points are pure-
strategy Nash equilibria. The (unique) fixed point of is the lowest Nash equilibrium
while the (unique) fixed point of is the largest Nash equilibrium.Theorem 1inSec-
tion 3shows the existence of these equilibria using a direct argument that does not in-
vokeFact 3.
2Fact 2states that the setarg maxxi∈Jiui(xix−i)≥iarg maxxi∈Jiui(xix−i).Here≥irepresents dominancein the strong-set order (defined inAppendix A).
3A function is quasi-supermodular iff(x)≥f(x∧y)impliesf(x∨y)≥f(y)andf(x)>f(x∧y)implies
f(x∨y) > f(y).
76 Joel Sobel Theoretical Economics 14 (2019)
3. Iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies
This section presents a smal generalization of Milgrom and Roberts (1990, Theorem 5).
So as to formulate the result, letXˆ⊂X. Define a mappingZfrom subsets ofXto
subsets ofXby
Zi(ˆX)= xi∈Xi:for alxi∈Xithere existsˆx∈Xˆsuch thatui(xixˆ−i)≥uixixˆ−i
andZ(Xˆ)={(z1 zI):zi∈Zi(ˆX)}. Strategies inZi(ˆX)are not dominated inXˆ−i.
LetZ(Xˆ)denote the interval[inf(Z(ˆX)) sup(Z(ˆX))]. The process of iteratively deleting
strictly dominated strategies starts withX0=Xand letsXt=Z(Xt−1).Astrategyxi∈
Xiisserialy undominatedifxi∈Zi(Xt)for alt.
Theorem1.Let be an ID-supermodular game. For each playeri, there exist largest
and smalest serialy undominated strategies,xiandxi. Moreover, the strategy profiles
{xi:i∈I}and{xi:i∈I}are pure Nash equilibrium profiles.
Theorem 1is Milgrom and Roberts’s Theorem 5 under the assumption of inter-
val dominance rather than increasing diferences. The theorem folows from the next
lemma. I include a proof of the lemma to identify precisely where I relax Milgrom and
Roberts’s condition.
LetBi(x)andBi(x)denote the smalest and largest best responses foritox∈X,and
letB(x)andB(x)denote the colectionsBi(x)andBi(x),i∈I.
Lemma1.Letzz∈X be profiles such thatz≤z. ThensupZ([zz])=B(z)and
infZ([zz])=B(z),andZ([zz])=[B(z)B(z)].
Proof. The largest and smalest best responses are wel defined byFact 1. By definition,
B(z)andB(z)are inZ([zz]),andthus[B(z)B(z)]⊂Z([zz]). Supposez/∈[B(z)B(z)]
and, in particular, supposezi iz∗i≡Bi(z).Iclaimthatzi/∈Zi([zz])becauseziisstrongly dominated byzi∨z∗i.Foranyxi∈[zizi∨z∗i),
uixi∨z∗iz−i−ui(xiz−i)≥uiz∗iz−i−uixi∧z∗iz−i>0 (2)
where the first inequality folows from supermodularity and the second inequality fol-
lows from the definition ofz∗i.It folows from (2)thatforanyxi∈[zizi∨z∗i),
uixi∨z∗iz−i>ui(xiz−i) (3)
Furthermore, ifxi∈[zizi∨z∗i),thenxi∨z∗i=zi∨z∗iand inequality (3) implies thatforxi∈[zizi∨z∗i),
uizi∨z∗iz−i>ui(xiz−i) (4)
It folows from ID and (4)thatifzi iz∗i,then
uizi∨z∗iz−i>ui(ziz−i) for alz−i∈[z−iz−i]
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An analogous argument applies to show that ifzi iBi(z),thenziis strictly dominated.
It is straightforward to show that (3) folows from quasi-supermodularity whenxi i
z∗i, so the lemma holds if the weaker assumption of quasi-supermodularity replaces A3in the definition of ID-supermodular games.
Milgrom and Roberts (1990, Theorem 5) state and prove this result for supermod-
ular games. The proof above folows their proof. They derive inequality (2)andthen
complete the proof by pointing out that increasing diferences implies
ui(zi∨zˆiz−i)−ui(ziz−i)≥ui(zi∨zˆiz−i)−ui(ziz−i) (5)
provided thatz−i≥z−i. The lemma folows from (2)and(5). I simply point out that the
ID condition is sufficient for the result.
Milgrom and Roberts use the lemma to prove the theorem. Their proof goes through
without modification.
Later in the paper I discuss economicaly interesting games in which the mathemat-
ical extensions I propose lead to sharper predictions. I conclude this section with an
example of a game that satisfies the assumptions ofTheorem 1, but does not satisfy the
assumptions of Milgrom and Roberts’s theorem.
Example1. There is a finite numberN of players and strategies are elements of
[0M]M >0. The payof to playeriisui(xix−i)=αg(xi) j=ixj−C(xi)forα>0.
Ifg(·)is strictly increasing, thenui(·)satisfies increasing diferences; ifg(·)is positive,
thenui(·)satisfies single crossing, butui(·)satisfies interval dominance without any as-
sumptions ong(·). The game stil may have strategic complementarities. There are pa-
rameter values in which the game has multiple, Pareto-ranked pure-strategy equilibria.
For example, ifC(x)≡x3and
g(x)=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x ifx∈[01]
2−x ifx∈(13)
x−4 ifx∈[3M]
then there wil be a range of values forα(N−1)in which there is an equilibrium in
whichxi=1for ali(this equilibrium exists: given that other players setxi=1,player
jprefers to setxj=1than any other value) and another (nondisjoint) interval in which
xi=α(N−1)/3>4for ali. ♦
4. Iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies
Modifications of the proofs ofLemma 1andTheorem 1alow us to establish descriptions
of the set of strategies that survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies.
Definition5. Given a game =(IX u≥)and subsetsXi⊂Xi,withX = i∈IXi,playeri’s s t ra t e g yxi∈Xiis weakly dominated relative toX if there existszi∈Xisuchthatui(xix−i)≤ui(zix−i)for alx−i∈X−i, with strict inequality for at least onex−i∈X−i.
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Weak dominance wil typicaly delete more strategies than strong dominance. Hence
it has the potential to provide more restrictive predictions. I analyze the implications of
applying iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies instead of iterated deletion of
strongly dominated strategies. This section studiesiterated interval deletion of weakly
dominated strategies. The procedure iteratively removes weakly dominated strategies
beginning with a game 0=(IX0u≥)in whichinfX0=x0andsupX0=x0, and con-
structs games k=(IXku≥),whereinfXk=xkandsupXk=xkis the smalest set
such that al strategies inXk−1\[xkxk]are weakly dominated with respect toXk−1.
I wil describe the set of strategies that survive this process, that is, the set of strategies
that are inXkfor alk. It is possible that diferent ways to delete weakly dominated
strategies wil lead to diferent limit sets. I reference results that identify games in which
the order of deletion is essentialy unimportant.
The procedure that iteratively deletes dominated strategies works by assuming that
existing strategies are in an interval and then finding a (potentialy smaler) interval of
strategies that are undominated. It is possible that some strategies are weakly domi-
nated but not strictly dominated. If this happens, then the process of iterated deletion
of weakly dominated strategies wil lead to a smaler set of surviving strategies. In this
section, I point out how to modify Milgrom and Robert’s arguments to apply to weak
dominance. InSection 6, I discuss how weak dominance is, in fact, more selective than
strong dominance in cheap-talk games and that it is possible to use the arguments of
supermodular games to characterize a refined set of equilibria. Before stating and prov-
ing the extension ofTheorem 1to weak dominance, I provide an example that ilustrates
the value of the result.
Example2. Consider the game
L R
U 33 00
M 12 11
D 00 11
This game is supermodular. The arguments of Milgrom and Roberts guarantee that
there is a smalest and largest Nash equilibrium, which are(DR)and(UL), respec-
tively;D, however, is weakly dominated. Applying iterated deletion of weakly dominated
strategies leaves only the(UL)equilibrium. The selection seems plausible in the exam-
ple. I would like to know whether it is possible to rule out weakly dominated strategies
and stil preserve the structure identified inTheorem 1. The example suggests a possi-
bility. Milgrom and Roberts obtain a lower bound to the row’s strategies by taking the
smalest best reply. In the example,Dis the smalest best reply. Because best replies are
monotonic, the smalest best reply wil be a best reply to the column’s smalest strategy.
In the example, this strategy isR.NotethatRhas two best replies. What if, instead of
taking the smalest best reply toR(D) as a lower bound, one takes the largest best reply
(M)? BecauseMis larger thanD, it must do at least as wel asDagainst al of column’s
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strategies. That is, by selecting the largest best response to the smalest strategy of col-
umn, row eliminates weakly dominated strategies. This idea forms the basis of the proof
of the next result. ♦
Theorem2.Let be a finite ID-supermodular game. For each playeri, there exist largest
and smalest strategies that survive iterated interval deletion of weakly dominated strate-
gies,xiandxi. Moreover, the strategy profiles{xi:i∈I}and{xi:i∈I}are pure Nash
equilibrium profiles.
Theorem 2extendsTheorem 1to weak dominance. I have added the assumption
that is finite. I explain the importance of this assumption after the proof.
The theorem requires two preliminary results.
LetX =X1×···×XI⊂Xand
Eixi;X = zi∈Xi:ui(xiz−i)=ui(ziz−i)for alz−i∈X−i
be the set of strategies that give the same payof toiagainst al strategies inX−i.
Lemma2.Let be an ID-supermodular game. Letzz∈Xbe profiles such thatz≤z.
There exist largest and smalest strategies that are not weakly dominated relative to[zz].
These strategies are, respectively, the largest element inEi(Bi(z);[zz])and the smalest
element inEi(Bi(z);[zz]).
The way to construct the smalest strategy that is not weakly dominated for playeri
is to consider the set of strategies that are best responses to the lowest strategy in[zz].
If there are multiple best responses, the interval-dominance property suggests that the
largest of the best responses performs at least as wel as other best responses against
higher strategies. This observation makes the largest best response to the smalest strat-
egy a candidate for smalest strategy that is not weakly dominated. In fact, there may
be other, smaler, strategies that are equivalent to the largest best response toz−iin
the sense that these strategies yield identical payofs against al strategies in[z−iz−i].
The proof ofLemma 2shows that there exists a smalest strategy that is equivalent to
the largest best response toz−iand that this strategy is the smalest strategy that is not
weakly dominated. The details are given inAppendix B.
Letzz∈X be profiles such thatz≤z. LetEi(x;[z≤z])denote thesupof
Ei(x;[z≤z])and letEi(x;[z≤z])denote theinfofEi(x;[z≤z]).LetE(x;[z≤z])=
(E1(x;[z≤z]) EI(x;[z≤z]))andE(x;[z≤z])=(E1(x;[z≤z]) EI(x;[z≤z])).
Define
si=infxi∈[zizi]:xiis not weakly dominated in[zz]
and
si=supxi∈[zizi]:xiis not weakly dominated in[zz]
Now let Zwi([zz])=[sisi]andZw([zz])=(Zw1([zz]) ZwI([zz]). Finaly let
Zw([zz])denote the interval[inf(Zw([zz]))sup(Zw([zz]))].
Lemma 2implies the folowing result.
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Lemma3.Let be an ID-supermodular game. Letzz∈X be profiles such that
z≤z.ThenE(B(z);[zz])andE(B(z);[zz])exist,supZw([zz])=E(B(z);[zz])and
infZw([zz])=E(B(z);[zz]),andZ([zz])=[E(B(z);[zz])E(B(z);[zz])].
Lemma 3paralelsLemma 1. The first diference is that ifzi iz∗i≡E(B(z);[zz]),
there is no guarantee thatzi∨z∗istrictly dominateszi. It is possible thatzi∧z∗iis a
best response toz−i. Hence the second inequality in (2) could be weak. The second
diference is that one can use weak dominance rather than strict dominance to delete a
strategy. So one needs only to establish thatui(zi∨z∗iz−i)>ui(ziz−i)for somez−i∈
[zz]. This folows from the definition ofz∗i.
Proof ofTheorem2. The proof of the theorem folows the proof ofTheorem 1.Let
y1ibe equal to the smalest element inEi(Bi(z);[zz])and lety1ibe equal to the largest
element ofEi(Bi(z);[zz]).Lemma 3implies thaty1iandy1iare wel defined and are,respectively, the smalest and greatest strategies that are not weakly dominated rela-
tive to[zz]. It folows thatz≤y1≤y1≤z. Continuing inductively one can construct
sequences{yk}and{yk}such thatyk≤yk+1≤yk+1≤ykand every strategy outside of
[yk+1yk+1]is weakly dominated relative to[ykyk]. By monotonicity,limk→∞ykand
limk→∞ykexist. Denote the limits byyandy, respectively. It is straightforward to show
that these limits are Nash equilibrium profiles. In finite games (where the process of
deleting strategies terminates after a finite number of iterations), it folows by construc-
tion thatyandyare not weakly dominated by any strategy in[yy].FromLemma 3,
it folows that anything that survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies
must be inside the interval.
The process described only removes strategies outside of the interval[ykyk].Con-
sequently, it is possible that there are strategies in the interval[yy]that are weakly dom-
inated. When the strategy set is finite, it must be the case thatyiandyiremain undomi-nated even if additional strategies are deleted. To see this, notice that by constructionyiis a best response toy−iand the only other best responses toy−iin[yiyi]are equivalenttoyi.Consequently,yican only be weakly dominated ifyjis deleted forj=i. Hence
no procedure can deleteyi. Similarly,yicannot be deleted. This completes the proof ofTheorem 2.
Theorem 2uses the assumption that strategy sets are finite. This assumption guar-
antees that the iterated deletion process terminates in a finite number of steps and, con-
sequently, thatyandyare not weakly dominated. The next example demonstrates that
the bounds obtained through the process may be weakly dominated in games in which
Xiare infinite.
Example3. Consider a three player game in whichX1=[01]andXi=[02]fori=23,
u1(x)=x1(x2−1),andui(x)=x1x2x3−x3i/3fori=23.Inthiscaseyk=(122−k 22−k)
andyk=(000). It folows thaty=(111)andy=(000).Bothyandyare Nash
equilibria, buty1is weakly dominated with respect to strategies in[yy]. ♦
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Theorem 2applies to a particular procedure for removal of weakly dominated strate-
gies. Unlike iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, the outcome of iterated
deletion of weakly dominated strategies may depend on the procedure.4Nevertheless,
for some interesting classes of games, deletion of weakly dominated strategies is essen-
tialy independent of the procedure.
Marx and Swinkels (1997) show that if a game satisfies the transfer of the decision
maker indiference (TDI) property, then two “ful”5procedures for deleting weakly dom-
inated strategies are the same up to the addition or removal of redundant strategies and
a renaming of strategies. The TDI property states that if (given the behavior of the other
players) playeriis indiferent between two strategies, then al other players are also in-
diferent between playeri’s choice of strategies. TDI is restrictive, but can be shown to
hold in interesting applications including (genericaly) the examples described inSec-
tion 6.
Kultti and Salonen (1997and1998) take a diferent approach to the concern that
iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies may be order dependent. Kultti and Sa-
lonen (1997) study undominated equilibria in supermodular games.6An undominated
equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in which no player’s equilibrium strategy is weakly
dominated by another pure strategy. Börgers (1994) and Dekel and Fudenberg (1990)
identify properties that make undominated equilibria an attractive refinement of Nash
equilibrium. Kultti and Salonen (1997) show that in supermodular games there exist a
least and greatest undominated equilibrium in pure strategies.Example 3demonstrates
that the bounds that I have constructed may be dominated. Hence my result does not
include theirs.
Iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies yields stronger predictions in inter-
esting applications. Kultti and Salonen (1998) study a process in which players eliminate
al weakly dominated strategies in the first step and subsequently iteratively remove al
strictly dominated strategies. They present conditions under which this process identi-
fies the lower and upper bounds of the set of equilibrium payofs.
5. Additional properties
5.1Dynamics
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) show that there is a relationship between adaptive dynam-
ics and supermodular games. To do this, they consider a time-dependent strategy pro-
filex(t).TheyletP(Tt)denote the strategies played between timesTandt,P(Tt)=
{x(s):s∈[Tt)},andsaythat{x(t)}is a processconsistent with adaptive dynamicsif for
alT,thereexistsT>Tsuch that for alt>T,x(t)∈Z([infP(Tt)supP(Tt)]).They
definex=infX,x=supX,Bk(x)=B(Bk−1(x)),andBk(x)=B(Bk−1(x)),andshow(in
4Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002) show that iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies may be
order dependent in infinite games if payof functions and strategy spaces do not satisfy regularity condi-
tions.
5A ful procedure stops only if it reaches a stage where there are no weakly dominated strategies.
6In fact, Kultti and Salonen (1997and1998) study quasi-supermodular games in which the (weaker)
assumption thatuiis quasi-supermodular replaces A3 inDefinition 4.
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Theorem 8) that whenever{x(t)}is a process consistent with adaptive dynamics in a su-
permodular game, for alkthere existsTksuch that for alt>Tk,x(t)∈[Bk(x)Bk(x)].
The condition that a process is consistent with adaptive dynamics guarantees that
strategies played at timetare best replies to strategies played in the not-too-distant past.
The conclusion of the theorem is that any process consistent with adaptive dynamics
must eventualy stop playing strictly dominated strategies and therefore converge to the
interval of strategies with lower bound equal to the smalest Nash equilibrium and up-
per bound equal to the largest Nash equilibrium. This result is a direct consequence
ofLemma 1and holds for ID-supermodular games. It is straightforward to modify the
result to conclude that a more restrictive class of adaptive dynamics converges to the
smaler set of strategies identified inTheorem 2.
The process{x(t)}isconsistent with cautious adaptive dynamicsif for alT,there
existsT such that for alt>T,x(t)∈Zw([infP(Tt)supP(Tt)]).7 LetH1(x)=
E(B(x);[xx])H1(x)=E(B(x);[xx]),Hk(x)=E(B(Hk−1(x));[Hk−1(x)Hk−1(x)]),
andHk(x)=E(B(Hk−1(x));[Hk−1(x)Hk−1(x)]).
Theorem3.If{x(t)}is a process consistent with cautious adaptive dynamics in an
ID-supermodular game, then for alk,thereexistsTksuch that for alt>Tk,x(t)∈
[Hk(x)Hk(x)].
Theorem 3is a direct consequence ofLemma 3.
Echenique (2007) presents a modification of the procedure used to find upper and
lower bounds in the proofs ofTheorems 1and2to provide an algorithm that finds al
pure-strategy Nash equilibria in supermodular games. One can interpret the algorithm
as a dynamic process. Consequently, there exist adaptive processes that reach Nash
equilibria that do not survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. This re-
sult does not contradictTheorem 3. Instead it indicates that procedures that reach Nash
equilibria that do not survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies are not
cautious. A critical issue is whether it is plausible to restrict attention to cautious dy-
namics. I believe that the correct answer is “it depends.” On one hand, Cabrales and
Ponti (2000) and Gale, Binmore, and Samuelson (1995) present examples of plausible
evolutionary dynamics that converge to outcomes that use weakly dominated strate-
gies. On the other hand, Dubey, Haimanko, and Zapechelnyuk (2006) introducepseudo-
potential games. A pseudo-potential game is a game for which there exists function
φ:X→ Rsuch thatarg maxxi∈Xiφ(xix−i)⊂arg maxxi∈Xiui(xix−i). Dubey, Haimanko,and Zapechelnyuk (2006) give conditions under which games with complementarities
are pseudo-potential games. Their results imply that finite, two-player (ID) supermod-
ular games are pseudo-potential games. Dubey, Haimanko, and Zapechelnyuk identify
several properties of pseudo-potential games, including the property that there are no
best-response cycles in generic, finite pseudo-potential games. This property guaran-
tees convergence of best reply dynamics. Weak dominance has interesting implications
7I use “cautious” in the sense of cautious rationalizability in Pearce (1984). The notion is that the adaptive
process is a best response to beliefs that place positive probability on al “recently” used strategies.
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only for games with nongeneric payofs.8Cautiously adaptive dynamics provide a way
to extend these results to nongeneric games.
5.2Comparative statics
So as to ask comparative statics questions, assume that there is a partialy ordered set
of parametersPand there is a family of games{(p)}p∈P,where(p)={IX u(·;p)≥}
whereu:X×P→ RI.
Theorem4.If{(p)}p∈Pis a family of ID-supermodular games anduisatisfies interval
dominance inxiandpfor fixedx−i, then the largest and smalest strategies that sur-
vive iterated interval deletion of weakly dominated strategies,xi(p)andxi(p), are non-
decreasing functions ofp.
The proof of this result is a straightforward modification of Theorem 6 in Milgrom
and Roberts (1990). The proof, which is provided inAppendix B, requires verification
thatHandHare monotonic.
Milgrom and Roberts (1990, Theorem 7) give conditions under which it is possible
to compare payofs of diferent equilibria.
Theorem5.Let =(IX u≥)be an ID-supermodular game. Letxiandxidenote the
smalest and largest elements ofXi, and supposeyandzare two equilibria withy≥z.
(i) Ifui(xix−i)is increasing inx−i,thenui(y)≥ui(z). (i) Ifui(xix−i)is decreasing
inx−i,thenui(y)≤ui(z). If the condition in (i) holds for some subset of playersI1and
the condition in (i) holds for the remainderI\I1, then the largest equilibrium is the
most preferred equilibrium for the players inI1, and the least preferred for the remaining
players.
This result holds in my setting, but one variation is worth noting. If condition (i)
in the theorem holds, then the largest Nash equilibrium is Pareto dominant (in the set
of Nash equilibria). It is possible that strategies used in this equilibrium do not sur-
vive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. The upper bound inTheorem 2
may therefore not be the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium. Instead it wil be (in fi-
nite games), the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium in strategies that survive iterated
deletion of weakly dominated strategies. Milgrom and Roberts discuss an interesting
classes of games (games with positive spilovers) in which equilibria are Pareto ranked.
The literature treats the largest Nash equilibrium as salient in these games. For typical
specifications of these games, the largest equilibrium is also an equilibrium that survives
iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies.9
8The applications I study have nongeneric normal-form payofs because they are derived from games
with a fixed dynamic structure.
9Nevertheless,Theorem 5suggests that in more general settings the Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium
may fail to survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies.
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5.3Quasi-supermodularity
This paper concentrates on weakening the monotonicity condition (increasing difer-
ences) used by Milgrom and Roberts. Theorem 1merely replaces increasing difer-
ences with interval dominance.Theorem 2extends the result—again with the weaker
condition—to iterated weak dominance. In the same way, one can replace the super-
modularity assumption with quasi-supermodularity. The concepts compare values of
two quantities, which are both the diference between a function evaluated at a higher
and a lower point. Supermodularity and increasing diferences require that the first
quantity is greater than the second. Quasi-supermodularity and single crossing (in-
terval dominance) require the weaker condition that the first quantity is nonnegative
(positive) whenever the first one is nonnegative (positive). It is the second implication
that is needed for the main results. That is,Theorems 1and2hold if payof functions
are quasi-supermodular. I chose not to state the more general results because I know of
no application in which payofs are quasi-supermodular but not supermodular.10
5.4Identification
There is a literature that estimates supermodular games. For example, Uetake and
Watanabe (2013) use the bounds constructed in Milgrom and Roberts (1990, Theorem 5)
to generate moment inequalities. I believe that the same techniques would apply to es-
timate strategies that satisfy the refinement (surviving iterated deletion of weakly dom-
inated strategies). The bounds constructed inTheorem 2would replace those inThe-
orem 1.11This kind of study would be consistent with research by Aradilas-Lopez and
Ta m e r (2008), which compares the identification power of rationalizability to Nash equi-
libria, and Molinari and Rosen (2008), who estimate level-krationality in a supermodu-
lar game.
There is an econometric literature that tries to identify and test monotone compara-
tive statics in supermodular games. There are two basic approaches. The first approach
(for example, Lazzati2015and Uetake and Watantabe2013) is to impose monotonicity
and study the restrictions imposed by a solution concept (Nash equilibrium or rational-
izability) on data. One could ask this question instead by requiring the solution only
use strategies that survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies.Theorem 2
suggests new bounds on strategies that would replace the restrictions the literature has
provided for rationalizability.
Another approach imposes no a priori restrictions and asks when a data set is con-
sistent with equilibrium behavior in a supermodular game. Lazzati, Quah, and Shirai
(2016) provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a data set to be consistent with
Nash equilibrium behavior in a supermodular game with a one-dimensional strategy
10Quah and Strulovici (2007, Theorem 1) recognize that it is possible to obtain comparative-statics results
with a weaker version of supermodularity. They demonstrate that an interval-dominance version of the
condition is sufficient for basic results.
11One limitation of the approach is that Uetake and Watanabe focus on one-dimensional strategies
spaces. The ID-supermodular games that I identify inSection 6in which weak dominance has selection
power involve multidimensional strategy spaces.
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space. A natural modification of the question is to ask whether the data set is consistent
with equilibrium behavior in weakly undominated strategies in an ID-supermodular
game.
6. Applications
Extending the results about supermodular games from strong to weak dominance is
more than a curiosity only if there exist interesting games under which the assumptions
of the previous section hold and the arguments reduce the set of predictions. An ideal
application would be an ID-supermodular game that is not supermodular, in which
weak dominance arguments have more power to refine the set of equilibria than strong
dominance arguments and in which insights about the structure of equilibria available
from the results in this paper have substantive interest.
Examples 1and2provide some evidence of the usefulness of the approach, but
these examples primarily ilustrate technical points and are somewhat artificial. Sobel
(2017) shows how iterated weak dominance has the power to select outcomes in games
with preplay communication about intentions. These games are not ID-supermodular
games, but the selection arguments use partial ordering on strategies and monotonicity
properties that are similar to the methods in the current paper.
This section applies the ideas to cheap-talk games and games with competition in
persuasion.
6.1Cheap talk
Cheap-talk games add a round of strategic behavior to an underlying game. This kind of
game is a natural place to expect weak dominance to play a role as weak dominance can
place restrictions on of-the-path behavior.
Cheap-talk games are not supermodular, but have some of the structure of super-
modular games. Strong dominance arguments do not restrict the predictions. The ap-
plication is imperfect because the game is not ID-supermodular. I must extend the the-
ory somewhat.
In a cheap-talk game, nature selectst∈T; one player, the sender (S), learnstand
sends a messagem∈M; the other player, the receiver (R), takes an actiona∈Ain re-
sponse tom. A strategy forSis a mappingσ:T→ M. A strategy forRis a mapping
α:M→ A. Assume thatM is a finite, ordered set, and thatAandTare equal to the
unit interval. Assume that there is a prior distribution on types; for convenience as-
sume that the prior is finitely supported andp(t)is the probability that the type ist.
Payofs depend only onaandt. The payof to playeriwhentis the sender’s type and
ais the action of the receiver isUi(at). Assume thatUi(·)is twice continuously dif-
ferentiable, with negative second derivative with respect toaand positive cross partial.
With this structure, orderRstrategies in the natural way:12α ≥Rαifα(m)≥α(m)
for alm.OrderSstrategies “backward” so thatσ ≥Sσif and only ifσ(t)≤σ(t)for
alt.13The payof functions for the cheap-talk game areuS(σα)=EUS(α(σ(t))t)and
12Note that I use≥to denote both the standard order on the real numbers and the order on strategies.
13This ordering guarantees thatR’s best response on the equilibrium path increases whenS’s s t ra t e g y
increases.
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uR(ασ)=EUR(α(σ(t)t)), where the expectation is taken using the prior on types. It
is straightforward to check that this game satisfies the transfer of decision maker indif-
ference condition of Marx and Swinkels (1997).
I describe several properties of this class of games and show how the general results
provide some insight into the structure of their equilibria.
Lemma4.Fori=SR,ui(·)is supermodular inxifor fixedx−iin cheap-talk games.
Lemma 4folows from a straightforward argument, which appears inAppendix B.
Without further assumptions best responses wil not have any monotonicity prop-
erties in the basic cheap-talk game. For example, suppose thatUR(at)=−(a−t)2and
the prior is uniform on{01/N k/N 1}for some even numberN. Assume that
Mcontains messagesm0andm1withm0<m1. If the sender always sendsm0,thenitis
a best response for the receiver to respond tom0with05and al other messages with 0.
Denote this strategy byα∗∗.Let
σ(t)= m1 ift∈[005]m0 ift∈(051]
and α(m)= 1 ifm=m00 otherwise
The receiver prefersα∧α∗∗toαwhenSalways sendsm0,butR’s preferences reverse
whenSplaysσ. Consequently, interval dominance does not hold forR.Onecanalso
confirm thatS’s preferences violate interval dominance and that the violations do not
depend on the choice of order overS’s s t ra t e g i e s.
Best response correspondences do have some monotonicity properties for a re-
stricted version of the cheap-talk game. Henceforth consider amonotonic restrictionof
the cheap-talk game. In the monotonic restriction, the sender and receiver are restricted
to monotonic strategies (σis monotonic ift>t impliesσ(t)≥σ(t);αis monotonic if
m >mimplies thatα(m)≥α(m)). See Kartik and Sobel (2015) for a justification of the
monotonic restriction. I cal the monotonic restriction of a cheap-talk game amonotone
cheap-talk game.
Even with the restriction to monotonic strategies, the cheap-talk game does not sat-
isfy increasing diferences.
To see that the sender’s payof does not satisfy increasing diferences, letσ(t)≡0
andσ(t)≡1so thatuS(σα)−uS(σα)=E[US(α(0)t)−US(α(1)t)]. The right-hand
side is not monotonic inα(0)(or inα(1)), so the increasing diference condition does
not hold.
To see that the receiver’s payof does not satisfy increasing diferences, letα(t)≡1.
HenceuR(ασ)does not depend onσ. Fix a message˜mand let
α(m)= 0 ifm≤m˜1 ifm>m˜
so thatuR(ασ)−uR(ασ)=Eσ(t)≤m˜[UR(t0)−UR(t1)]. Increasingσcan increase or
decrease this quantity.
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In general, the receiver’s preferences do not satisfy ID. To see this, letm0denote the
lowest message and suppose thatσ(t) > m0for alt, whereasσ(t)≡m0. It folows
thatσ ≥Sσ. It is straightforward to constructσ,α,andα∗such thatuR(α∨α∗σ)>
uR(ασ)butuR(α∨α∗σ)<uR(ασ). For example, letσbe a separating strategy, let
α∗be a best response toσ,andletα(m)=arg max tUR(at)p(t)for alm.
Consequently, the general results about ID-supermodular games do not apply to this
example. So as to use the characterization results, I must weaken the ID property.
Definition6. LetXandYbe lattices. A functionf:X×Y→ Rsatisfies the weak
generalized interval-dominance property (WID) in its two arguments on the setX×Y
if for aly>y,
fx∨ty ≥fx y
=⇒ ∃t˜≤t fx∨t˜y ≥fx y such that fx∨t˜y ≥fx y (6)
and
fx∧ty ≤fx y
=⇒ ∃t˜≥t fx∧t˜y ≤fx y such that fx∧t˜y ≤fx y (7)
The WID condition is weaker than ID.Appendix Cproves this result and introduces
related concepts. One way to get an intuition for WID is to compare it to single crossing,
which requires conditions (6)and(7)toholdwhen˜t=t.14
ID and WID are both conditions that relate to how solutions tomaxxui(xy)change
with the parametery.Fact 2states that in an ID-supermodular game, playeri’s s e t o f
best responses are increasing inx−i, where “increasing” is interpreted in the sense of
the strong set order. Ifui(·)satisfies WID, then best responses are increasing in a weaker
sense.
The next result describes a property of WID. The proposition uses the nota-
tionx∗∗∈arg maxf(xy),x∗∈arg maxf(xy),x∗∗=max arg maxf(xy),andx∗=
min arg maxf(xy).
Proposition1.LetXandYbe lattices. If the functionf:X×Y→ Rsatisfies WID and
is supermodular inxfor fixedy,thenfory>y,
x∗∗∨x∗∈arg maxfxy and x∗∧x∗∗∈arg maxfxy (8)
Appendix Ccontains a proof ofProposition 1. The conclusion ofProposition 1cer-
tainly holds whenarg maxui(·x−i)is increasing in the strong set order (provided that
there exist solutions to the maximization problems). It is straightforward to confirm
that the monotonicity property in the proposition is actualy weaker.
I say that a game =(IX u≥)is WID-supermodular if it satisfies conditions A1–
A3 inDefinition 4and condition A4 is replaced by the requirement thatuisatisfies WID
inxiandx−ion al interval sublattices ofX.
14The analog to (7) in the definition of single crossing is implied by condition1in Definition2.
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The class of WID-supermodular games is interesting because monotone cheap-talk
games are WID-supermodular and because the equilibria of these games have some of
the important properties of ID-supermodular games. The remainder of this subsection
reports results that confirm these claims. I show first that monotone cheap-talk games
are WID-supermodular. I conclude the subsection (Theorem 6) with the observation
that equilibria that survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies have nice
bounds in WID-supermodular games.
Lemma5.The receiver’s preferences in a monotone cheap-talk game satisfy WID.
Similarly, the sender’s preferences also satisfy WID but not ID.
Lemma6.The sender’s preferences in a monotone cheap-talk game satisfy WID.
Lemmas 4,5,and6combine to establish the folowing proposition.
Proposition2.Monotone cheap-talk games are WID-supermodular.
Proposition 2is useful because it is possible to extendTheorem 2. Although I am un-
able to prove an analog toLemma 2for WID-supermodular games, the folowing result
holds for WID-supermodular games.
LetinfX=x0andsupX=x0.
Theorem6.Let be a WID-supermodular game. For each playeri, there exist pure Nash
equilibrium strategiesxiandxisuch that al strategies that survive iterated interval dele-
tion of weakly dominated strategies are contained in[xixi]. Moreover, there exist an in-
creasing sequence{yn}∞n=1and a decreasing sequence{yn}∞n=1,wherey0=x0andy0=x0,
forn≥1,yn=B(yn−1)andyn=B(yn−1),andx=limn→∞ynandx=limn→∞yn.
Theorem 6combines elements ofTheorem 1andTheorem 2. Al three results iden-
tify extreme, pure-strategy Nash equilibria. The bounds inTheorem 6are the same
as the bounds inTheorem 1. At each stage of the deletion process, the lower (upper)
bound is the smalest (largest) best response to the smalest (largest) remaining strategy
of the opponent.Theorem 6uses a weaker assumption on preferences (weak interval
dominance rather than interval dominance), but it is not a generalization ofTheorem 1
because to obtain the bounds inTheorem 6, I must delete weakly dominated strate-
gies.Theorem 6shares withTheorem 2the focus on eliminating weakly dominated
strategies. Compared toTheorem 2,Theorem 6applies to a larger class of games (ev-
ery WID-supermodular game is also ID-supermodular), but delivers a less restrictive
conclusion because the bounds derived inTheorem 2may define a strictly smaler set
than the bounds inTheorem 6.
Replacing the interval-dominance assumption with the weak interval-dominance
assumption means that it is no longer possible to guarantee that best-response cor-
respondences are increasing in the strong set order.15 Consequently, the argument
15Best-response correspondences are increasing in the weaker sense described inProposition 1.
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sketched at the end ofSection 2that establishes the existence of pure-strategy Nash
equilibria using Tarski’s fixed-point theorem does not apply. The existence of pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium does folow from iterating best replies.
Appendix Cprovides details of the modifications of earlier arguments needed to
proveTheorem 6. The proof paralels the proof ofTheorem 1. The only diference is
that when WID replaces ID, the argument inLemma 1that establishes that anyzinot
greater than a putative lower bound is strictly dominated uses ID. If I replace ID by WID,
then the identical argument only guarantees thatziis weakly dominated.
Example 3applies to WID-supermodular games, so that the profilesxandxneed
not survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. If the original game is fi-
nite, then the bounds must survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies.
Provided that a parameterized family of WID-supermodular games satisfies WID in own
strategy and parameter, the monotonicity of the bounds inTheorem 6with respect to
changes in the parameter holds for WID-supermodular games. Similarly,Theorem 3
extends to WID-supermodular games.
Theorem 6is useful: simple cheap-talk games are an example of a game that is WID-
supermodular, but not ID-supermodular. InExample 4, the upper and lower bounds
provided inTheorem 6are equal, providing a selection result even when multiple Nash
equilibria exist.
Example4. Assume that there are two playersSandR, two equaly likely states1and
3, three actions1,2,and3, and two messagesLandH. A strategy forSis a pairm1m2,
wheremi∈{LH}is the message sent when the sender observes statei. A strategy for
Ris a paira1a2,whereaj∈{123}is the action taken when the receiver receives the
messagej. Assume thatUS(at)=−2(a−t−b)2andUR(at)=−2(a−t)2,whereb≥0
is a parameter that measures the conflict of interest betweenSandR.
The folowing table describes the expected payofs.16I have deleted strategies that
are not monotonic.
LL LH HH
11 −4−b2−(2+b)2 −4−b2−(2+b)2 −4−b2−(2+b)2
12 −4−b2−(2+b)2 −1−b2−(1+b)2 −2−(1−b)2−(1+b)2
13 −4−b2−(2+b)2 0−2b2 −4−b2−(2−b)2
22 −2−(1−b)2−(1+b)2 −2−(1−b)2−(1+b)2 −2−(1−b)2−(1+b)2
23 −2−(1−b)2−(1+b)2 −1−(1−b)2−b2 −4−b2−(2−b)2
33 −4−b2−(2−b)2 −4−b2−(2−b)2 −4−b2−(2−b)2
This is not an ID-supermodular game. A straightforward way to see this is to note
that the best-response correspondence is not monotonic. Specificaly, the receiver’s best
responses toLL,LH,andHHare{2223},{13},and{1222}, respectively.
The first round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies yields
16Rows representR’s strategies; columns representS’s strategies; cels contain row’s payofs and column’s
payofs.
90 Joel Sobel Theoretical Economics 14 (2019)
LL LH HH
12 −4−b2−(2+b)2 −1−b2−(1+b)2 −2−(1−b)2−(1+b)2
13 −4−b2−(2+b)2 0−2b2 −4−b2−(2−b)2
22 −2−(1−b)2−(1+b)2 −2−(1−b)2−(1+b)2 −2−(1−b)2−(1+b)2
23 −2−(1−b)2−(1+b)2 −1−(1−b)2−b2 −4−b2−(2−b)2
The second round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies yields
LH HH
12 −1−b2−(1+b)2 −2−(1−b)2−(1+b)2
13 0−2b2 −4−b2−(2−b)2
22 −2−(1−b)2−(1+b)2 −2−(1−b)2−(1+b)2
23 −1−(1−b)2−b2 −4−b2−(2−b)2
The third round of deletion yields
LH HH
12 −1−b2−(1+b)2 −2−(1−b)2−(1+b)2
13 0−2b2 −4−b2−(2−b)2
The rest of the analysis depends on the value ofb.Ifb∈[01/2], then removing
weakly dominated strategies yields the single outcome(13LH);ifb≥1, then removing
weakly dominated strategies yields the single outcome(12HH);ifb∈(1/21),thenno
more strategies can be deleted. The game has two Nash equilibria: the pure-strategy
equilibrium(12HH)and a completely mixed equilibrium.
Several things are worth noting. The profile(12HH)corresponds to the babbling
(no-communication) equilibrium. It is a Nash equilibrium of the original game (with-
out deleting strategies), but whenbis smal, it is removed. Hence the procedure reduces
the set of predicted payofs. Another strategy profile,(22LL), also supports the babbling
outcome. Iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies removes this profile. Conse-
quently, the procedure not only selects payofs, it selects the relationship between types
and messages that support the equilibrium. Whenb>0, the sender has an upward bias.
The procedure predicts thatSwil “exaggerate” and avoid her lowest message.
Theorem 6specifies a particular order in which one deletes strategies. This order
preserves the lattice structure. (I did not remove al weakly dominated strategies in the
first stage.)
Finaly, payofs satisfy increasing diferences in own strategy and the parameterb.
HenceTheorem 4applies: whenbis smaler, the “largest” equilibrium increases. Kartik
and Sobel (2015) study the implications of applying iterated deletion of weakly domi-
nated strategies to monotonic cheap-talk games in more detail. ♦
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6.2Competition in persuasion
Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017) study a model of persuasion in which informed agents
simultaneously announce “information structures” to a decision maker. The decision
maker then obtains a signal induced by the join of the information structures and makes
a decision. (For example, if each agent selects a partition, then the decision maker learns
that the state of the world is in the intersection of the partition elements.) Gentzkow and
Kamenica use the model to investigate how competition between agents influences the
amount of information available to the decision maker. There always exists a ful disclo-
sure equilibrium in which two or more agents announce the finest feasible disclosure
policy. Any other equilibrium is preferred by al agents to the ful-disclosure equilib-
rium. One can model this situation in reduced form as a game between the agents in
which their strategies are information structures and payofs are the expected value as-
suming that the decision maker makes optimal decision given available information.
Formaly, let =(IX u≥)be such thatui(x)=Ui(x1∨x2∨···∨xI).Thefunction
uidoes not satisfy the interval-dominance property inxiandx−i. To see this, letI=2,
letXi⊂R, and assume thatx2>x1>x1>x2. It folows thatu1(x1x2)=u1(x1x2),butit could be thatu1(x1x2)>u1(x1x2)for alx1∈(x1x1). Nevertheless,ui(·)does sat-isfy WID. To see this, let˜t=t∧x(for the first part of the definition) and let˜t=t∨x(for
the second part of the definition). Hence, this game wil be a WID-supermodular game
provided that eachUi(·)satisfies the necessary supermodularity and continuity proper-
ties. (These wil certainly hold ifXiis a bounded subset ofRandUi(·)is continuous for
ali.) It folows thatTheorem 6appliestothisgame.
These games typicaly have multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria, but iterated weak
dominance makes a selection. To see this clearly, consider the case in whichUi(·)is
one-to-one. The most preferred equilibrium is defined by a disclosure levelπ∗defined
by
π∗=minπ:Ui(π) > Ui(xi)for alxi>πand ali
Proposition3.Suppose thatXiis a finite subset ofRindependent ofiand thatUi(x)=
Ui(x)ifx=x.Ifxis a strategy profile that survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated
strategies,max{x1 xI}=π∗.
I provide a proof ofProposition 3and additional results inAppendix D.17
This game fails to satisfy the Marx and Swinkels (1997)TDIproperty.IfUi(x)=Ui(x)
forx=x, then it is possible for the set of strategies that survive Iterated Deletion of
Weakly Dominated Strategies to depend on the order. It is possible to establish a version
of Proposition3.
AppendixA: Definitions
Folowing Milgrom and Roberts, I define several basic concepts.
17This result is part of work in progress with Keri Peicong Hu.
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Definition7. GivenT⊂X,b∈Xis caled an upper bound forTifb≥xfor alx∈T;it
is the supremum ofT(denotedsup(T )) if it is an upper bound and for al upper boundsb
ofT,b≥b. Lower bounds and infimums are defined analogously. A pointxis a maximal
element ofXif there is noy∈Xsuch thaty>x(that is, noysuch thaty≥xbut not
x≥y); it is the largest element ofXifx≥yfor aly∈X. Minimal and smalest elements
are defined similarly.
Definition8. The setX is a lattice if for each two point set{xy}⊂X,thereisa
supremum for{xy}(denotedx∨yand caled the join ofxandy) and an infimum
(denotedx∧yand caled the meet ofxandy)inX. The lattice is complete if for al
nonempty subsetsT⊂X,inf(T )∈Xandsup(T )∈X. An interval is a set of the form
[xy]≡{z:y≥z≥x}.
Definition9. A sublatticeTof a latticeXis a subset ofXthatisclosed under∧and∨.
An interval sublatticeTof a latticeXis a sublattice ofXof the form[xx]for somexx∈
X,x≤x. A complete sublatticeTis a sublattice such that the infimum and supremum
of every subset ofTis inT.
Definition10. A chainC⊂Xis a totaly ordered subset ofX,thatis,foranyx∈Cand
y∈C,x≥yory≥x.
Definition11. Given a complete latticeX, a functionf:X→ Ris order continuous
if it converges along every chainC(in both the increasing and decreasing directions),
that is, iflimx∈Cx↓infCf(x)=f(inf(C))andlimx∈Cx↑supCf(x)=f(sup(C)).Itisorder
upper semicontinuous iflim supx∈Cx↓infCf(x)≤f(inf(C))andlim supx∈Cx↑supCf(x)≤
f(sup(C)).
Definition12. A functionf:X→ Ris supermodular if for alxy∈X,
f(x)+f(y)≤f(x∧y)+f(x∨y)
Definition13. The setSdominatesSin the strong set order (writtenS≥S)ifx∗∈S
andx∗∗∈Simply thatx∗∧x∗∗∈Sandx∗∨x∗∗∈S.
AppendixB: Proofs
This appendix contains proofs that did not appear in the main text.
Letwi=Bi(z)be the largest best response of playerito the smalest strategy profile.
Proof ofLemma2. It folows from ID that anyxi≤iwiis either weakly dominated by
wior equivalent towiin the sense thatui(xix−i)=ui(wix−i)for alx−i∈[z−iz−i].
Note thatwiis not weakly dominated. To see this, suppose thatwiis a best response
toz−i. On one hand, becausewiis the largest best response toz−i,wi≤iwi.Conse-
quentlywiis equivalent towior is weakly dominated bywi. Consequently, no strategy
that best responds toz−ican weakly dominatewi. On the other hand, any strategy that
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weakly dominateswimust be a best response toz−i. It folows thatwiis not weakly
dominated.
Hence any strategy inEi(wi;[zizi])(a strategy equivalent towi) is not weakly dom-
inated. I claim thatEi(wi;[zizi])is a lattice. Ifxixi∈Ei(wi;[zizi]),thenxi∨xiandxi∧xiare best responses toz−i. Hencexi∨xi≤wiby the definition ofwi. Conse-quently, by ID,xi∨xi∈Ei(wi;[zizi]). Furthermore,ui(xi∧xiz−i)≤ui(xi∨xiz−i)foralz−i∈[z−iz−i]by ID. It folows that
2uixi∨xiz−i≥uixi∨xiz−i+uixi∧xiz−i
≥ui(xiz−i)+uixiz−i
=2uixi∨xiz−i (9)
where the second inequality folows from supermodularity and the equation folows be-
causexixixi∨xi∈Ei(wi;[zizi]). Consequently, the first inequality in (9)mustbeanequation andxi∧xi∈Ei(wi;[zizi])by supermodularity.BecauseEi(wi;[zizi])is a lattice anduis order upper semicontinuous, it is a com-
plete lattice and has a smalest element,w∗i.Iclaimthatw∗iis the smalest strategy thatis not weakly dominated. We know thatw∗iis not weakly dominated. Take anyzi iw∗i.Note that for alxi∈[w∗izi∨w∗i],
uixi∨w∗iz−i−ui(xiz−i)≥uiw∗iz−i−uixi∧w∗iz−i≥0 (10)
where the first inequality folows by supermodularity and the second folows becausew∗iis a best response toz−i. Furthermore, ID and (10) imply that
uizi∨w∗iz−i−ui(ziz−i)≥uiw∗iz−i−uizi∧w∗iz−i≥0 (11)
for alz−i∈[z−iz−i]. Inequality (11) cannot always hold as an equation, because that
would implyzi∧w∗i∈Ei(wi;[zizi]), which cannot be true becausew∗i>izi∧w∗iis thesmalest element inEi(wi;[zizi]).Consequently,(11) implies thatzi∨w∗iweakly dom-inateszi. It folows thatw∗iis the smalest of[zizi]that is not weakly dominated.A similar argument demonstrates that there is a largest element of[zizi]that is not
weakly dominated.
Proof ofTheorem4.LetH(xp)be the smalest strategy that is equivalent to the
largest best response tox;H(xp)=w∗exists becauseEi(wi;[zizi])is a complete
lattice. I claim thatH(xp)is nondecreasing inp. To do this, I wil show that if
zi w∗i,thenziis weakly dominated relative to[zizi](in thepgame). Note that foralxi∈[w∗izi∨w∗i],
uixi∨w∗iz−ip−ui(xiz−ip)≥uiw∗iz−ip−uixi∧w∗iz−ip ≥0 (12)
where the first inequality folows by supermodularity and the second folows becausew∗iis a best response toz−i. Furthermore, ID and (12) imply that forxi∈[w∗izi∨w∗i],
uixi∨w∗iz−ip−ui(xiz−ip)≥uiw∗iz−ip−uixi∧w∗iz−ip ≥0 (13)
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for alz−i∈[z−iz−i]. ID implies that
uixi∨w∗iz−ip−ui(xiz−ip)≥0 (14)
for alz−i∈[z−iz−i]. Becausexi∧w∗i<w∗i, it folows from the definition ofw∗ithatxi∧w∗iis not equivalent tow∗i. Consequently, the second inequality in (13)holdsstrictlyfor somez−i. Expression (13) therefore implies thatzi∨w∗iweakly dominateszifor pref-erencesui(·p).Consequently,(13), (14), and ID imply thatzi∨w∗iweakly dominates
zifor preferencesui(·p)forp>p. This establishes thatHi(xp)(and henceH(xp))
is nondecreasing, because ifzi Hi(xp)is weakly dominated, every Nash equilibrium
that survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies satisfiesH(xp)≤x.By
Tarksi’s fixed-point theorem,x(p)=inf{x:H(xp)≤x}is a fixed point ofH(·p),so
it is the smalest Nash equilibrium. A similar argument applies to the largest equilib-
rium.
Proof ofLemma4. Wehave
uSσ∨σ α+uSσ∧σ α
=EUSαminσ(t)σ(t) t+USαmaxσ(t)σ(t) t
=EUSασ(t) t+USασ(t) t
=uS(σα)+uSσ α
uRα∨α σ +uRα∧α σ
=EURmaxασ(t) ασ(t) t+URminασ(t) ασ(t) t
=EURασ(t) t+URασ(t) t
=uR(ασ)+uRα σ
Proof ofLemma5. AssumeuR(α∨α∗σ)≥uR(ασ).Let˜α∗=min arg maxαuR(ασ)
be the smalest best response toσ.FromProposition 5(Appendix C), it sufficient to
show that ifσ ≥Sσ,thenuR(α∨˜α∗σ)≥uR(ασ).Letμσ(·|m)be the posterior
distribution overtgivenσ(t)=m. The posterior is wel defined if there existstsuch that
σ(t)=m. It suffices to prove that, for almin the image ofσ(·),
t
URmaxα(m)α˜∗(m) tμσ(t|m)≥
t
URα(m)tμσ(t|m) (15)
I divide the argument into four cases depending on whetherσ(t) < mfor alt,σ(t)=m
for somet,σ(t) > mfor alt,orσ(t)=mfor alt,andthereexisttandtsuch that
σ(t)<m<σ(t).
Ifσ(t) < mfor alt,thenσ(t) < mfor alt(recal thatσ ≥Sσimpliesσ(t)≤σ(t)
for alt), somis not in the image ofσ(·).
If there existstsuch thatσ(t)=m, then becausemis in the image ofσ(·)and
σ ≥Sσ,μσ(·|m)(weakly) stochasticaly dominatesμσ(·|m). Because˜α∗(m)solves
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maxa tUR(at)μσ(t|m), it folows from the supermodularity ofuR(·)that the solu-
tion tomaxa tUR(at)μσ(t|m)is greater than˜α∗(m)and by concavity ofUR(·t)that
inequality (15)holds.
Ifσ(t) > mfor alt,then˜α∗(m)=0by definition and inequality (15)holds.
It remains to consider the case in which there does not existtsuch thatσ(t)=m,
butσ(t)<m<σ(t)for sometandt. In this case, definemto be
maxm <m:there existstsuch thatσ(t)=m
It folows that˜α∗(m)solvesmaxa tUR(at)μσ(t|m).Lett=max{t:σ(t)≤m}.Be-
causeσ(t)=mfor somet,tis wel defined. Furthermore,˜α∗(m)≤arg maxUR(at).
Becauseσ ≥Sσ,μσ(t|m)=0ift<t.Hence
α˜∗(m)≤arg maxUR(at)≤arg max
t
UR(at)μσ(t|m)
and so (15)holds.
A symmetric argument establishes that ifσ ≥Sσ,uR(α∧α∗∗σ)≥uR(ασ),then
uR(α∧˜α∗∗σ)≥uR(ασ)(when˜α∗∗is the largest best response toσ).
Proof ofLemma6. Assume thatuS(ασ∗∨σ)≥uS(ασ).Let˜σ∗=min arg maxuS(α
σ)be the smalest best response toα. FromProposition 5, it suffices to show that
ifα ≥Rα,thenuS(α σ∨˜σ∗)≥uS(α σ). It suffices to show that, for alt,σ(t) <
σ˜∗(t)implies thatUS(α(˜σ∗(t))t)≥US(α(σ(t))t).Ifσ(t) <σ˜∗(t), then by defini-
tion ofσ˜∗,US(α(˜σ∗(t))t) > US(α(σ(t))t). The inequality must be strict because
σ˜∗is the smalest best response (so typetsends the highest message that leads to
the maximum available payof) and˜σ∗(t) > σ(t). It folows from concavity ofUS(·t)
thatUS(α(˜σ∗(t))t)≥US(α(σ(t))t). This inequality may be weak (ifα(˜σ∗(t))=
α(σ(t))) so that ID does not hold.
A symmetric argument establishes that ifα ≥Rα,uS(α σ∗∗∧σ)≥uS(α σ)im-
plies thatuS(α σ˜∗∗∧σ)≥uS(α σ),where˜σ∗∗=max arg maxuS(α σ).
Proof ofTheorem6.Letx0be the smalest strategy profile and letx0be the largest
strategy profile. I claim that the set of strategies that are not weakly dominated is con-
tained in[y0y0]. Supposez/∈[y0y0]and, in particular, supposezi iy0i.Iclaimthatzi
is weakly dominated byzi∨y0i.Observe that
uizi∨y0ix0−i−uizix0−i≥uiy0ix0−i−uizi∧y0ix0−i>0 (16)
where the first inequality folows from supermodularity and the second inequality fol-
lows from the definition ofy0i.It folows from (16)that
uizi∨y0ix0−i>uizix0−i (17)
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Becausey0iis the smalest best response tox0−i, it folows from WID and (17)thatif
zi iy0i,then
uizi∨y0iz−i≥ui(ziz−i) for alz−i∈x0−ix0−i (18)
Because inequality (18)holdsstrictlywhenz−i=x0−iby inequality (16), it folows thatzi
is weakly dominated byzi∨y0i. An analogous argument applies to show that ifzi ix0i,thenziis weakly dominated.
It is straightforward to continue the argument by induction to obtain a nested se-
quence of intervals[ykyk]and to conclude that the limiting interval has the desired
properties.
AppendixC
This appendix clarifies the connection between the WID and ID conditions. I begin
by introducing a new concept and then I show its relationship to ID. I then introduce
another concept and show that it is equivalent to WID. The new definitions are trans-
parently nested, making it clear that ID implies WID. Finaly, I prove that WID implies
that best responses are monotonic in a way that is implied by ID. Throughout I wil as-
sume thatXandYare lattices,f(·)is a functionf:X×Y→ R,andarg maxx∈Jf(xy)
is nonempty for al intervalsJ⊂Xandy∈Y.
Definition14. Assumex∗∈arg maxx∈Xf(xy),andx∗∗∈arg maxx∈Xf(xy).Afunc-
tionf:X×Y→ Rsatisfies the revised interval-dominance property (RID) in its two
arguments on the setX×Yif for aly≥y,
fx∨x∗y ≥fx y =⇒ fx∨x∗y ≥fx y
and
fx∧x∗∗y ≥fx y =⇒ fx∧x∗∗y ≥fx y
RID is an awkward condition because it relies on conditions defined in terms ofx∗.
It is a useful formulation for some of the arguments in Appendix B. Lettingx=x∨x∗,
it folows thatx≥xand therefore the conditions inDefinition 14are implied by single
crossing.Definition 14imposes the condition less often than single crossing. The next
result demonstrates that RID is a reformulation of ID.18
Proposition4.LetXandYbe lattices. A supermodular functionf:X×Y→ Rsatis-
fies ID if and only if it satisfies RID on al intervals[x x]⊂X.
Proof ofProposition4. First I show that RID implies ID. Iff(x y)≥f(xy)for
alx∈[x x],thenx ∈arg maxx∈[xx]f(xy). It folows thatf(x∨xy)≥f(xy)
and so RID implies thatf(x y)≥f(xy)forx∈[x x]. It remains to show that
18I owe this argument to an anonymous referee.
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iff(x y)>f(xy),thenf(x y)>f(xy). Butiff(xy)≥f(x y),then
x∈arg maxx∈[xx]f(xy)so RID implies thatf(xy)≥f(x y). Consequently,if
f(x y)>f(xy),thenf(x y)>f(xy). It folows that if RID holds on al intervals,
then ID holds.
Next I show that ID implies RID. Fix an interval [x x]⊂X. Letx∗∈
arg maxx∈[xx]f(xy)andx∗∗∈arg maxx∈[xx]f(xy).
Letf(ˆx∨x∗y)≥f(ˆxy)for someˆx∈[x x].
It folows from supermodularity off(·)that for anyx∈X,
fx∨x∗y +fx∧x∗y ≥fxy +fx∗y (19)
Becausexx∗∈[x x]implies thatx∧x∗∈[x x], it folows from the definition ofx∗
thatf(x∗y)≥f(x∧x∗y)for alx∈[x x]. Inequality (19) implies that
fx∨x∗y ≥fxy (20)
for alx∈[x x]. Becauseˆx∈[x x],(20)implies
fx∨x∗y ≥fxy (21)
for alx∈[ˆxxˆ∨x∗]. Becausex∈[ˆxxˆ∨x∗]implies thatx∨x∗=xˆ∨x∗, it folows that
f(x∨x∗y)=f(ˆx∨x∗y).Consequently,(21) implies thatf(ˆx∨x∗y)≥f(xy)for al
x∈[ˆxxˆ∨x∗]and, therefore, by ID,f(ˆx∨x∗y)≥f(ˆxy).
A similar argument establishes the symmetric implication.
The next definition paralels RID.
Definition15. Assumey>y,x∗∈arg maxx∈Xf(xy),andx∗∗∈arg maxx∈Xf(xy).
Afunctionf:X×Y→ Rsatisfies the revised weak interval-dominance property (RWID)
in its two arguments on the setX×Yif
fx∨x∗y ≥fx y
=⇒ ∃x˜∗∈arg max
x∈X
fxy x˜∗≤x∗ such that fx∨x˜∗y ≥fx y
and
fx∧x∗∗y ≤fx y
=⇒ ∃x˜∗∗∈arg max
x∈X
fxy x˜∗∗≥x∗∗ such that fx∧x˜∗∗y ≤fx y
It is clear that RID implies RWID. The next result shows that WID and RWID are
equivalent.Propositions 4and5imply that ID implies WID.
Proposition5.LetXandYbe lattices. Assumey>y. A supermodular function
f:X×Y→ Rsatisfies the revised weak interval-dominance property (RWID) in its two
arguments on the setX×Yif and only if it satisfies WID in its two arguments on the set
X×Y.
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Proof ofProposition5. If WID holds, then RWID clearly holds. I want to show
that iff(x∨zy)≥f(xy),thenf(x∨z˜y)≥f(xy)forz˜≤z. Letz∗=
min arg maxw∈[x∧zz]f(wy). It folows thatx∧z∗∈[x∧zz]sof(z∗y)≥f(x∧z∗y).It
folows from supermodularity thatf(x∨z∗y)≥f(xy). Hence RWID implies that
f(x∨z∗y)≥f(xy). Becausez∗≤zandf(z∗y)≥f(zy), it folows that WID
holds.
Proposition 1(stated in the text) shows that WID implies that solutions to param-
eterized optimizations are increasing in a sense that is weaker than the strong set
order. The proposition uses the notationx∗∗∈arg maxf(xy),x∗∈arg maxf(xy),
x∗∗=max arg maxf(xy),andx∗=min arg maxf(xy).
Proof ofProposition1. By definition,f(x∗y)≥f(x∗∧x∗∗y)and, hence, by su-
permodularity,f(x∗∨x∗∗y)≥f(x∗∗y). It folows from RWID thatf(x∗∨x∗∗y)≥
f(x∗∗y)and hence thatx∗∨x∗∗∈arg maxf(xy). A similar argument shows that when
RWID holds,x∗∗∧x∗∈arg maxf(xy).
Proposition 1is a variation onFact 2. Both results demonstrate how assumptions
onf(·)make it possible to evaluate how the set of solutions to the parameterized opti-
mization problemmaxx∈Jf(xy)change with the parametery.Fact 2demonstrates that
supermodularity and ID combine to guarantee that maximizers are increasing with re-
spect to the strong set order.Proposition 1demonstrates that supermodularity and WID
combine to guarantee that maximizers are increasing in the weaker sense captured by
(8).19
LiCalzi and Veinott (1992) present several variations on single-crossing conditions.
Corolary 11 contains results that demonstrate diferent ways in which these conditions
can lead to monotone comparative statics with respect to diferent ways to order sets.
These results are in the spirit ofProposition 1but are distinct.
AppendixD
This appendix provides a proof ofProposition 3.
There is a finite set of players;Idenotes the player set. The strategy set for playeriis
Xi, a finite subset of the real line. AssumeXiis independent ofi.Fory=(y1 yl),yi∈
R,letM(y)=max{y1 yl}. Payofs are given byui(x)=Ui(M(x)),whereUi(·):X→ R
are arbitrary.20
Definition16. Thesmalest strict Pareto disclosureis
π∗=minπ:Ui(π) > Ui(xi)for alxi>πand ali
19The relationship induced by the conditions in (8) need not be transitive. That is, it is possible for
arg maxf(xy1)to be distinct fromarg maxf(xy2)and for (8) to hold both when(y1y2)=(yy)and when
(y1y2)=(y y).
20IfXi=Xj, then we can replace both sets byXi∪Xjand extend preferences by assigning a low value
toUi(xi)forxi/∈Xi. This formulation applies to situations where the outcomexis unattractive to playeri
ifx/∈Xi.
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Definition17. Thesmalest weak Pareto disclosureis
π˜∗=minπ:Ui(π)≥Ui(xi)for alxi>πand ali
Because the game is finite, it is clear thatπ∗andπ˜∗are wel defined and thatπ∗≥˜π∗.
Equality wil hold ifUi(·)is one-to-one for each player.
Any strategy profilexthat satisfiesxi≤πfor aliandxj=πforatleasttwojis a
Nash equilibrium forπ=π∗andπ˜∗.
Ful disclosure is always a Nash equilibrium in this game, but there are typicaly
other Nash equilibria. It is straightforward to show that pure-strategy Nash equilibria
are Pareto ranked. Ifx∗andx∗∗are both Nash equilibria andM(x∗)≤M(x∗∗),then
ui(x∗)≥ui(x∗∗)for ali.
Playeri’s s t ra t e g yxi∈Xiis weakly dominated relative toX if there existszi∈Xisuch thatui(xix−i)≤ui(zix−i)for alx−i∈X−i, with strict inequality for at least onex−i∈X−i.Denote the set of strategies that survive IDWDS byS.
Lemma7.For alx∈Sand everyi,thereexistsxi∈Sithat is a best response toxrelative
toXi.
Proof. The result is clear if the best response toxhas not yet been deleted. If the best
response toxhas been deleted, then it was deleted by a strategy that weakly dominates
it. This strategy must be a best reply tox.
Lemma8.There exists a strategy profilex∈Ssuch thatmax{x1 xI}≤π∗.
Proof. Suppose that afterkiterations, there exists a strategy profilexsatisfying the
condition in the lemma. In the next iteration, every agent must have a strategy that is a
best response toxbyLemma 7. The best response must do at least as wel as disclosing
π∗. By definition ofπ∗, no strategyxi>π∗can do at least as wel asπ∗againstx.Hence
a strategy less than or equal toπ∗must remain.
Lemma9.There exists no strategy profilex∈Ssuch thatM(x) <π˜∗.
Proof.Let˜xbe a strategy profile that minimizesM(x)subject toxsurviving IDWDS.
This strategy profile exists and, byLemma 8,M(x˜)≤π∗.Let˜π≡M(x˜). I wish to show
thatπ˜≥˜π∗. To reach a contradiction, assume that˜π<π˜∗. By the definition of˜π∗,it
must be the case that for somei,
there existsxiwithπ˜<xi≤˜π∗ such that Ui(xi)>Ui(˜π) (22)
because otherwiseπ˜∗would not be the smalest weak Pareto disclosure.Lemma 7guar-
antees that playerihas a best response tox˜relative to the original strategy set that sur-
vives IDWDS. Denote such a strategy byyi.Iclaimthatyi>π˜. It folows from (22)that
yi= ˜π.Ifyi<π˜,thenmaxj=i{˜xj}= ˜π, because otherwise(˜x1 yi x˜I)would be a
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strategy profile that survives IDWDS such thatM(x˜1 yi x˜I)<˜π, a contradiction
to the definition of˜π.Consequently,ifyi<π˜,thenmaxj=i{˜xj}= ˜π. But this is impossible
by the definition ofyiand (22). Hence,yi>π˜as claimed.
I next claim thatyiweakly dominatesx˜i.Foranyx−isuch thatM(x−i)≥yi,˜xi≤
M(x˜)≤M(x−i)and so
ui(yix−i)=UiM(x−i)=ui(˜xix−i)
For anyx−isuch thatM(x−i)<yi,
Ui(yi)=ui(yix−i)≥UiM(x˜ix−i)=ui(˜xix−i)
from the definition ofyi. It folows thatyiis weakly better than˜xi. Furthermore,
ui(yix˜−i)=Ui(yi)>Ui(˜π)=ui(˜x)=ui(˜xix˜−i) (23)
where the strict inequality folows from (22) and the definition ofyi. Inequality (23) guar-
antees thatyiis strictly better than˜xiwhenx−i=x˜−i.Hence,yiweakly dominatesx˜ias
claimed. By definition,x˜survived IDWDS. Hence we have a contradiction.
Lemma10.No strategyzi>π∗survives IDWDS.
Proof.LetSkibe the set of strategies remaining for playeriafterkrounds of deletingstrategies. For eachi,letPki={ski∈Ski:ski>π∗}.Ifthereexistsksuch that iPki=∅,then the proof is complete. Otherwise, letzkj=min{ski:ski∈Pkifor somei},where
zkj∈Pkj. Weclaimthatzkjis weakly dominated byπ∗.Foranyxsuch thatM(x−j)≥zkj,
uj(zkj x−j)=uj(π∗x−j).Foranyxsuch thatM(x−j)<zkj,M(x−j)≤π∗by the defini-
tion ofzkj.Hence,playerj’s utility usingzkjisUj(zkj), while playerj’s utility from usingπ∗isUj(π∗). It folows from the definition ofπ∗that playerjdoes strictly better us-
ingπ∗thanzkjwheneverM(x−j)<zkj. Because there always exists a strategy in which
M(x−j)<zkjbyLemma 8,π∗must be strictly better thanzkjagainst one strategy profile
that survives IDWDS. Consequently,π∗weakly dominateszkj. It is possible thatπ∗/∈Skj,
but in this case there must remain a strategyx∗j∈Skjsuch thatuj(x∗jx−j)≥uj(π∗x−j)
for alx−j∈Sk−j. Therefore,x∗jweakly dominateszkjand sozkjmust eventualy be
deleted. Hence there must exist ak∗such thatPk∗i =∅for ali, which establishes theresult.
Proposition6.Ifxis a strategy profile that survives IDWDS, thenM(x)∈[˜π∗π∗].Ifx
is a Nash equilibrium strategy profile that survives IDWDS, thenui(x)≥Ui(π∗)for ali.
Proof.Lemma 9guarantees that there are no strategy profiles with maximum less than
π˜∗.Lemma 10guarantees that no strategy that discloses more thanπ∗survives. This
establishes the first part of the proposition. Given any surviving strategyx, it folows
fromLemma 7that each player has a surviving strategy that is a best response tox−i
relative to the ful strategy set. Sincexi=π∗leads to payofUi(π∗)for playeriagainst
any surviving strategy byLemma 10, the second part of the proposition folows.
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Corollary1.Ifπ∗=˜π∗, then for alxthat survive IDWDS,M(x)=π∗.
Corolary 1folows directly fromProposition 6. It folows from the definition ofπ∗
andπ˜∗thatπ∗=˜π∗wil hold provided thatUi(·)is one-to-one (no ties) for ali.
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